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25X1A

INFORMATION REPORT

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SUBJECT 1. Sentiment Against YUI Tse
25X1A 2. Communist Efforts to Win Over Prince Te

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SUPPLEMENT TO
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1. YUN Tse has begun to lose the confidence of the people of Inner Mongolia, because of his ignorance of the Mongolian language and his tendency to accept guidance from the Chinese Communists in his administration, disregarding the interests of the Mongols. The move of the capital from Wangyehmiao to Kalgan,* ostensibly for the purpose of better serving both the eastern and western parts of Inner Mongolia, was really designed to take Hafongga, the vice chairman of the government and a leader of youth in the Northeast, out of an area where his influence was strong. The move antagonized the young people and was resented by the people in general. A final source of irritation was the transfer of the thirty thousand Mongol cavalry at Wangyehmiao to LIN Piao's command [REDACTED]
2. In order to bolster up his personal prestige and at the same time consolidate the control of the Chinese Communists, YUN Tse suggested that no minority group should be allowed to form its own organization or send its own representative to the government. A racial affairs committee has been established in each province, with the result that Mongol interests and rights are dealt with by the various provincial governments, controlled by the Racial Affairs Commission in Peiping. The resentment of this move was great, and between November 1949 and March 1950, YUN Tse, who is vice chairman of the Racial Affairs Commission, barely escaped three attempts on his life. The assassin in the second attempt was a youth from the Northeast.***
3. The emissaries sent by the Military and Political Commission of the Northwest Military Region to establish contacts with Prince Te and attempt to persuade him to join the Chinese Communists were PAI Hai-feng, a member of the Commission, and HO Chao-lin.**** They did not see Te, but were reported in May 1950 to be making a second attempt.

*** Comment. It is probable that the name of LIN Piao is as a result of long association used to indicate the Chinese Communist

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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forces in Manchuria. The number of Mongol troops seems unduly high. Estimates of the total strength of the Inner Mongolian forces in 1948 were from 30,000 to 40,000, with a preference for the lower figure [REDACTED]. A detailed report, [REDACTED] accounted for a much smaller number.

*** [REDACTED] Comment. [REDACTED] erroneously reported all three attempts as having occurred before 1 December 1949.

**** [REDACTED] Comment. [REDACTED] reported the failure of the first mission, but indicated a later date for the second attempt. See [REDACTED] for references on HO Chao-lin and PAI Hai-feng.

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